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We present a secure multi-party quantum summation protocol based on quantum teleportation,
in which a malicious, but non-collusive, third party (TP) helps compute the summation. In our pro-
tocol, TP is in charge of entanglement distribution and Bell states are shared between participants.
Users encode the qubits in their hand according to their private bits and perform Bell-state mea-
surements. After obtaining participants’ measurement results, TP can figure out the summation.
The participants do not need to send their encoded states to others, and the protocol is therefore
congenitally free from Trojan horse attacks. In addition, our protocol can be made secure against
loss errors, because the entanglement distribution occurs only once at the beginning of our protocol.
We show that our protocol is secure against attacks by the participants as well as the outsiders.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation, as a subfield in cryptography, has been gaining attention in recent years [1–4]. It
was first introduced by Yao [5] and later extended by Goldreich et al. [6]. Secure multi-party computation has also
been studied in quantum settings [7–11]. Lo [7] pointed out the insecurity of quantum computation without a third
party in a two-party scenario. Chau [9] employed quantum resources to speed up classical multi-party computation.
Ben-Or et al. [10] investigated distributed quantum computation. They showed how many players must be honest
in order to make any multi-party quantum computation secure. Smith [11] proved that any multi-party quantum
computation can be secure as long as the number of dishonest players is less than n/6, when n, the number of players,
is larger than 6.
Secure multi-party quantum summation [12–16], which helps the construction of complex multi-party computation,
is a fundamental primitive of secure multi-party quantum computation. In quantum summation protocols, the privacy
of participants’ inputs is preserved and the correctness of the summation is guaranteed by quantum properties. Quan-
tum summation has also potential applications in quantum voting [17–21] and quantum private equality comparison
[22–24]. Designing quantum summation protocols that can be implemented with current or near future quantum
technologies is therefore of interest, as we pursue in this paper.
In the past few years, various quantum summation protocols have been proposed by employing a variety of quantum
resources. Zhang et al. [25] presented a quantum summation protocol with single photons encoded in both polarization
and spatial-mode degrees of freedom in 2014, in which unitary operations are utilized to encode the private bits on the
travelling single photons. Such single photons must somehow be handed over/transmitted to the next user so that the
collective sum of all private bits can be calculated. Most other protocols rely on sharing a multipartite entangled state
among players. For instance, in 2015, a quantum summation protocol without a trusted third party was constructed
[26]. However, the number of participants was limited to three due to the requirement of the so-called genuinely
maximally entangled six-qubit states. In 2016, Shi et al. [27] used quantum Fourier transform, controlled NOT
(CNOT) gates and oracle operators to propose protocols for summation and multiplication. Later, they proposed a
common quantum solution to a class of two-party private summation problems [28]. In 2017, a multi-party quantum
summation without a trusted third party was investigated by first generating a multipartite entangled state by one
player and then sharing it with other users [29]. In the same year, Liu et al. [30] adopted Bell states to construct
multipartite entangled states that were used to carry participants’ inputs, where the quantum communication in their
protocol is two-way. This means that special care with regard to Trojan horse attacks [31–33] should be provided
to participants. Unlike their protocols, participants in our protocol do not need to send the encoded states back to
others, thus our protocol is naturally free from Trojan horse attacks and no protection against such attacks are needed.
In 2018, Yang et al. [34] provided a quantum solution to secure summation depending on n-partite multi-dimensional
entangled states.
One common feature in all hitherto proposed quantum summation protocols is their dependence on a reliable means
for quantum state transfer. In the case of protocols that rely on sharing multipartite entangled states [27–30, 34], such
a state is often generated by one player and then its different components are sent to other players. If any of these
components does not reach its respective destination, then the whole procedure must be repeated. In such a case,
relying on photons travelling through lossy channels does not seem to be an efficient option. Moreover, it could open
us to new security threats that an eavesdropper can exploit by hiding behind the channel loss. Even for the case of
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2TABLE I. A comparison between different quantum summation (QS) protocols in terms of their required resources and
operations, as well as their efficiency.
QS protocols Efficiency Quantum resource Quantum Operations
Shi et al.’s [27] 13n−2 (n+1)-partite entangled state
Quantum Fourier operator, CNOT operator,
and oracle operator
Zhang et al.’s [29] 13n−2 n-partite entangled state CNOT operator and Hadamard operator
Liu et al.’s [30]
1
3n−2
or
1
3n+1
n-partite entangled state or
(n+1)-partite entangled state
Pauli operators and Hadamard operators
Yang et al.’s [34] 13n−2 n-partite entangled state Quantum Fourier operator and Pauli operators
This work 12n+3 Bell states Pauli operators and Bell measurement
the protocol in Ref. [25], the loss of the single photon in any leg of the system requires repeating the whole procedure.
In addition, an eavesdropper can send a photon of her choice to a user and measure it after the user has applied his
encoding to find out about the user’s private bit. Most these protocols fail to work unless a reliable quantum state
transfer (RQST) service is available to them. This is a kind of service that one may expect to have once we have a
fully functional quantum network.
There are two well-known approaches to RQST. In one scenario, one distributes entangled states between the two
end users of a quantum communication system, and then use teleportation to transfer an unknown quantum state
from one place to another. In the second approach, one has to use perhaps complex quantum error correction codes to
compensate for the erasure errors caused by photon loss as well as operational errors caused by system components.
In both cases, we need quantum memories in our setup to store quantum states and to execute certain quantum
processing tasks such as entanglement distillation or quantum error correction. This requirement of the system has
thus far been neglected in the design of quantum summation protocols.
In this paper, we take advantage of the idea of quantum teleportation [35] to devise our protocol. In order to get
a better insight into the practicality of a quantum summation protocol, in this work, we account for the bipartite
entangled states that one would need to distribute if teleportation is used for the RQST part of the protocol. We
discover that in fact such Bell states are sufficient to devise a secure quantum summation protocol without requiring the
distribution of additional multipartite entangled states. Moreover, by not revealing the information about which Bell
state is shared between two players, we, in effect, can protect ourselves against attacks by malicious participants. In
our protocol, similar to Ref. [25], participants’ private bits are encoded into single-qubit unitary operations. Encoded
states are then effectively teleported to the next user by performing local Bell-state measurements (BSMs). This
makes our protocol congenitally free from Trojan horse attacks. In our protocol, the required Bell states are shared
by a third party (TP), who can be malicious but does not collide with other players. In any case, our protocol does not
rely on multipartite entanglement or high-dimensional states, which makes its implementation much more feasible.
Table I summarizes the required resources for various protocols as compared to ours. In particular, we have
compared these protocols in terms of their efficiency, defined as the number of qubits (quantum memories) they need
in order to find the sum of n private bits, when one accounts for a minimum of two quantum memories needed for
teleportation. The assumption here is that maximally entangled states are shared among users, but we do not account
for additional memories that may be needed for entanglement distillation or for possible repeater nodes. It is clear
from this table that our protocol not only is more efficient than other protocols in the table but also only relies on
bipartite entanglement rather than multipartitite states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we illustrate our idea to design a secure multi-party
quantum summation protocol and provide an example of a two-party scenario. In Sec. III, we describe our multi-
party quantum summation protocol in detail, followed by its correctness and security analysis in Sec. IV. Practical
considerations of our protocol will be discussed in Sec. V, and conclusions are given in Sec. VI.
II. KEY IDEA OF OUR PROTOCOL
In this section, we work out our proposed quantum summation protocol for the particular case of two participants
and a malicious but non-collusive third party (TP). TP has to calculate the modulo 2 sum of the participants’ secret
bit by satisfying the following requirements:
1. Correctness: The result of summation in modulo two of all participants’ private input bits is correct.
2. Security: An eavesdropping outsider cannot learn any information about participants’ private input bits without
being detected.
33. Privacy: TP cannot learn about participants’ private input.
Note that although TP cannot obtain two participants’ private bits in the two-party scenario, each participant can
find out the private bit of the other participant once the sum is known. Nevertheless, this is a simple example by
which we can explain our protocol. In Sec. III, we generalize this idea to multiple participants scenario, where the
privacy requirement will be extended to include most participants as well as TP.
Our protocol relies on sharing a chain of Bell states among participants and teleporting an unknown state by TP
to itself via this chain; see Fig. 1. Along the way participants can affect the linked states by applying local operations
on their share of entangled states. TP can calculate the sum by comparing the teleported state with the original state
she has generated.
Before describing the protocol, let us first review the teleportation protocol and introduce the notation used in the
paper. In general, Bell states are of the following form
|Bxy〉 = 1√
2
(|0, x〉+ (−1)y|1, x⊕ 1〉), (1)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1} and ⊕ represents addition modulo 2. The relationship between Bell states and classical bits can
be defined as
|Bxy〉 ↔ xy, x, y ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
For any qubit |ϕ〉 and any single-qubit unitary operation U , a general teleportation equation, based on an initial Bell
state |Bab〉, a, b ∈ {0, 1}, shared between the two users, can be written as
|ϕ〉1 ⊗ (I ⊗ U)|Bab〉2,3 = 1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
∑
y∈{0,1}
(−1)b·x|Bxy〉1,2 ⊗ UZy⊕bXx⊕a|ϕ〉3, (3)
where X = (|0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|), Z = (|0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|) and the subscripts denote different systems.
In this work, we are particularly interested in the unitary operation U = ZX, for which we have:
UZbXa = ZXZbXa = (−1)bZbZXXa = (−1)bZbZXaX
= (−1)b · (−1)aZbXaZX = (−1)a⊕bZbXaZX
= (−1)a⊕bZbXaU,
(4)
where a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, the following equations
U |0〉 = ZX|0〉 = −|1〉, (5)
U |1〉 = ZX|1〉 = |0〉, (6)
U |+〉 = ZX|+〉 = |−〉, (7)
U |−〉 = ZX|−〉 = −|+〉, (8)
hold, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Note that both computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} and diagonal
basis {|+〉, |−〉} are closed under U . Ignoring the phase, U swaps |0〉 and |1〉 (|+〉 and |−〉). We use U = ZX from
now on and it will be applied on one of the two components of a Bell state if the participants’ private bit is 1.
Now, let us describe a simple version of our protocol that, for now, does not fulfill the security requirement; see
Figure 1. Suppose each participant has two quantum memories. Then, we implement the following steps:
(Step 1) Entanglement distribution. TP distributes Bell states, each of which is randomly selected from the Bell basis,
among participants and generates a state |ϕ〉T chosen randomly from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. The state
|ϕ〉T is stored in quantum memory T .
(Step 2) Private inputs encoding. P1 (P2) applies U = ZX on quantum memory 1 (quantum memory 3) if her private
bit is 1. Otherwise, she does nothing.
(Step 3) Bell-state measurement. TP measures quantum memories T and 0 in the Bell basis. Similarly, P1 (P2)
measures quantum memories 1 and 2 (3 and 4) in the Bell basis. P1 and P2 will announce their measurement
results to TP.
(Step 4) Correction and computation. After necessary corrections on quantum memory 5 depending on all the mea-
surement results and the original Bell states, TP measures quantum memory 5 in the same basis as that of
the original state of quantum memory T. If the state of quantum memory 5 is the same as the original state
of quantum memory T, TP concludes that the sum is 0, otherwise, the sum is 1.
4FIG. 1. A simple example of our protocol in the two-party scenario. (a) Step 1: TP shares entangled states among users to
create a chain of entangled links back to herself. In this example, we assume state |B00〉 is shared over all links. In general,
different Bell states can be shared over different links, and only TP knows which state has been shared. (b) Step 2: Users with
private bit 1 apply operator U to thier first qubit. Here, only P2 must do this. (c) Step 3: All players perform a BSM on their
two qubits and let TP know of the results. In our example, we have assumed |B00〉 has been obtained in all cases. (d) Step 4:
TP measures qubit 5 in the same basis as her originally chosen basis for qubit T . By comparing the result with the original
state of T , TP can calcualte M1 ⊕M2.
Let us work out a simple example to show how the protocol works. In Figure 1,
(Step 1) Entanglement distribution. Suppose the initial state among TP, P1 and P2 is given by
|ζ0j 〉 = |+〉T ⊗ |B00〉01 ⊗ |B00〉23 ⊗ |B00〉45. (9)
(Step 2) Private input encoding. Suppose P1’s (P2’s) private bit is 0 (1), P1 then does nothing on quantum memory 1,
but P2 applies U = ZX on quantum memory 3. According to Eqs. (3-8), the state becomes
|ζ1j 〉 =|+〉T ⊗ (I ⊗ I)|B00〉01 ⊗ (I ⊗ (ZX))|B00〉23 ⊗ |B00〉45
=
1
8
∑
x0∈{0,1}
∑
y0∈{0,1}
∑
x1∈{0,1}
∑
y1∈{0,1}
∑
x2∈{0,1}
∑
y2∈{0,1}
|Bx0y0〉T0|Bx1y1〉12|Bx2y2〉34Zy1⊕y2⊕y3Xx1⊕x2⊕x3 |−〉5, (10)
where a global phase in the state of quantum memory 5 is ignored.
(Step 3) Bell-state measurement. Suppose all the measurement results are x0y0 = x1y1 = x2y2 = 00, and they are
announced to TP. Then, effectively, the state of T is teleported to qubit 1, and then teleported to qubit to 3,
at which point it is flipped by the U operation, and teleported back to TP.
(Step 4) Correction and computation. In this particular case, there is no correction needed by TP. TP measures
quantum memory 5 in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}, and finds that the state of quantum memory 5 is different from
the original state of quantum memory T . TP concludes that the sum is 1.
5In (Step 3) of the above example, if not all the measurement result are 00, TP can correct the state of quantum
memory 5 by performing quantum operations on it using Eqs. (3-4) before she measures quantum memory 5.
In a full protocol, we need to include steps that alert us to possible attacks. We consider two kinds of attacks in
our protocol: those by outsides and those by malicious participants. We employ extra Bell states to detect these
attacks and meet the security requirements. By measuring each component of a Bell state in the same basis (all in
the computational basis or all in the diagonal basis) and comparing the measurement results, these attacks can be
detected. The details of the detection process can be found in Sec. III.
III. MULTI-PARTY QUANTUM SUMMATION
We assume that the classical channels are authenticated and quantum channels are noiseless. The third party, TP,
who conducts the summation is assumed to be malicious but non-collusive. That is to say, TP can do whatever she
would like within boundaries of quantum mechanics except collision with dishonest participants. The summation can
be revealed in public. For simplicity, we denote TP as P0 in the rest of the paper.
Suppose that the q-th participant (q = 1, 2, . . . , n; n > 2) has a private bit string Mq. P0 computes the summation
⊕∑nq=1Mq, where ⊕∑ denotes pointwise addition in modulo 2, and
M1 = (m11,m12, . . . ,m1L),
M2 = (m21,m22, . . . ,m2L),
. . . ,
Mn = (mn1,mn2, . . . ,mnL),
⊕∑nq=1Mq = (∑ni=1mi1,∑ni=1mi2, . . . ,∑ni=1miL),
(11)
where L is the length of each private bit string.
Our n-party (n > 2) summation protocol shall meet the following requirements:
1. Correctness: The result of pointwise summation in modulo two of all participants’ private input bits is correct.
2. Security: An outside eavesdropper cannot learn any information about participants’ private input bits without
being detected.
3. Privacy: No participant can learn about other participants’ private input bits without being detected, except
in the obvious case of n− 1 players collaborating to learn the remaining user’s private bits.
Our full protocol is described in the following.
(Step 1) Entanglement distribution. P0 uses a certain entanglement distribution protocol [36–40] to distribute (n +
1)(L + R) ordered Bell states, Ki = (|ψi1〉(2i)(2i+1)|ψi2〉(2i)(2i+1) . . . |ψiL+R〉(2i)(2i+1)) (i = 0, 1, . . . , n), where
|ψi1〉(2i)(2i+1) is chosen from the set {|Bxy〉|x, y ∈ {0, 1}}, to n participants such that these states form a chain.
Specifically, for Ki, all first (second) components of Bell states are stored in quantum memory G
i
2i (G
i
2i+1).
As shown in Figure 2, banks of quantum memories Gi−12i−1 and G
i
2i belong to Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and quantum
memories G00 and G
2n+1
2n are held by P0. P0 also generates L ordered states, AT = (|ϕ1〉T , |ϕ2〉T , . . . , |ϕL〉T ),
where |ϕi〉T (i = 1, 2, . . . , L) is randomly chosen from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. These states remain in P0’s
quantum memory G0T . Note that all the initial states are only known to P0.
(Step 2) Security detection. Participants detect if genuine Bell states are shared among them in an honest way.
(Step 2.1) To examine the genuinity of the Bell states shared between P0 and P1, P1 first randomly chooses R
Bell states shared between quantum memory G00 and quantum memory G
0
1 and asks P0 to announce
the corresponding initial states. P1 then measures each corresponding component in G
0
1 randomly in
the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} or in the diagonal basis {|+〉, |−〉}, and keeps the measurement results
to herself. Subsequently, P1 asks P0 to measure the corresponding components in the same basis as P1
does and publicize the measurement results. According to the property of Bell states, P1 checks if these
measurement results are correlated with each other. If the error rate exceeds a certain threshold, the
protocol will be aborted and repeated from (Step 1). Otherwise, the protocol will continue.
(Step 2.2) To check the genuinity of the Bell states shared between P0 and Pn, Pn also uses R Bell states to complete
this detection utilizing the similar method as that used by P1. If the error rate exceeds the threshold,
the protocol will be aborted and repeated from (Step 1). Otherwise, the protocol will continue.
6FIG. 2. Entanglement distribution by P0. Each player has a qubit which is entangled with another qubit held by the next user
in the chain. At the start of the protocol, TP shares L+ R Bell states over each link, where R of which (randomly chosen) is
used for detecting malicious activities.
7(Step 2.3) To check the genuinity of the Bell states shared between Pi and Pi+1 (i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1), Pi randomly
selects R/2 Bell states shared between Gi2i and G
i
2i+1 and asks P0 to announce the corresponding initial
states. Later, Pi measures each corresponding component in G
i
2i randomly in the computational basis
or in the diagonal basis, announcing the measurement results. Next, Pi+1 measures each component
in Gi2i+1 entangled with the one in Pi’s hands in the same basis, publicizing the measurement results.
Pi and Pi+1 can finally check if these measurement results are correlated according to the initial states
and the property of Bell states. The same procedure will be used by Pi+1 with R/2 Bell states of his
choice and randomly selected measurement bases. If the error rate in either case exceeds the threshold,
the protocol will be aborted and repeated from (Step 1). Otherwise, they ensure that the states shared
between them are genuine Bell states and distributed in an honest way, and the protocol will continue.
(Step 3) Private input encoding. P0 removes R states used for detection from quantum memory G
0
0 (G
n
2n+1), leaving L
ordered states, denoted by V 00 (V
n
2n+1), in it. Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) also removes R states used for checking from
quantum memory Gi−12i−1 (G
i
2i), resulting in L ordered states, denoted by V
i−1
2i−1 (V
i
2i), in it. Note that quantum
memories Gi2i and G
i
2i+1 (i = 0, 1, . . . , n) now share L ordered Bell states, which form L chains of Bell states
among all participants (inlucding P0). Namely, the j-th (j = 1, 2, . . . , L) state of V
i
2i in G
i
2i and the j-th one
of V i2i+1 in G
i
2i+1 form a Bell state. Afterwards, Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) performs U
mi1
i ⊗ Umi2i ⊗ . . . ⊗ UmiLi on
the ordered sequence V i−12i−1, where Ui = U = ZX and (mi1,mi2, . . . ,miL) is Pi’s private bit string.
(Step 4) Bell-state measurement. P0 measures the j-th (j = 1, 2, . . . , L) state of V
0
0 and the j-th one in quantum
memory G0T in the Bell basis, obtaining measurement results (x01y01, x02y02, . . . , x0Ly0L) in accordance with
Eq. (2). Similarly, Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) measures the j-th state of V
i−1
2i−1 and the j-th one of V
i
2i in the Bell basis,
attaining measurement results (xi1yi1, xi2yi2, . . . , xiLyiL). Finally, They announce the measurement results
to P0.
(Step 5) Correction and computation. Based on all the measurement results and the knowledge of original Bell states
(only known to P0), P0 performs correcting operations on the j-th (j = 1, 2, . . . , L) state of V
n
2n+1. Next, P0
measures these resulted states in the same basis as the original states in quantum memory G0T , gaining the
measurement results (t1, t2, . . . , tL). With these measurement results, P0 compares the j-th state of V
n
2n+1
with the j-th original state in quantum memory G0T . If these two states are the same (different), P0 knows
that the j-th bit of the sum is 0 (1). At last, P0 can achieve the sum modulo 2 of participants’ private bit
strings, and the privacy of these private strings is preserved.
Note that, if the summation is only intended for a certain participant, say Pi, she can be selected as the one who
distributes Bell states like TP. The process is analogous to that with TP if Pi is also assumed to be malicious, but
non-collusive.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MULTI-PARTY QUANTUM SUMMATION
In this section, we study the security of our protocol. It can be verified that the protocol would provide us with the
correct sum if all parties follow the protocol. A detailed derivation of the correctness is given in Appendix A. In terms
of security, we have to show that our protocol is secure against both outsider and participant attacks, and it fulfills
the security and privacy requirements mentioned in Sec. III. In our case, an outsider can potentially influence our
protocol via the initial entanglement distribution. We show here how by using extra Bell states we can verify if the
distributed states are genuinely Bell states. There also exist Trojan horse attacks [31–33], such as the delay-photon
Trojan horse attack and the invisible photon eavesdropping Trojan horse attack if quantum states are encoded and
relayed in quantum communications protocols. Since our protocol uses Bell states to compute the summation and no
encoded states are needed to be relayed, our protocol is secure against these attacks. We therefore, here, focus on
the case of an attack by the TP, or possibly an outsider, and leave the details of the security against other malicious
participants to Appendix A.
Attacks from P0. We here consider the attacks from P0 who cannot collude with any other participants. For
simplicity, we suppose that P0 wants to obtain one bit of Pi’s (i 6= 1, n) private bit string and consider the chain
related to this bit. In order to learn about this bit of Pi, P0 has to find out if Pi performs quantum operation U = ZX
on her memory. P0 can therefore launch entanglement swapping attack on this chain, as shown in Fig. 3.
Suppose, in Fig. 3, the states of quantum memories b and (2i − 1) and quantum memories c and (2i) distributed
by P0 are |B00〉b(2i−1) and |B00〉c(2i), respectively. Pi will apply U = ZX on quantum memory (2i − 1) if her secret
bit is 1, otherwise she will do nothing. Pi then measures quantum memories (2i − 1) and (2i) in the Bell basis and
announces her measurement result xiyi to P0 as described in (Step 4) in the proposed protocol. After that, P0 can
8FIG. 3. Entanglement swapping attack by P0 through sharing entangled states in a dishonest way.
measure quantum memories b and c as well and obtain the measurement result xcyc. Because the original states of
quantum memories b and (2i− 1) and quantum memories c and (2i) are the same, if xiyi and xcyc are the same, P0
knows that Pi has not performed U on quantum memory (2i− 1) and learns about Pi’s private bit being 0, according
to the entanglement swapping property. Otherwise, P0 concludes that Pi’s private bit is 1. However, this attack
will be detected in (Step 2) where the genuinity of Bell states shared between Pi and Pi+1 (between Pi−1 and Pi) is
checked.
To show this note that Bell states can be rewritten in linear and diagonal bases as follows
|B00〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+ +〉+ | − −〉), (12)
|B01〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉), (13)
|B10〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) = 1√
2
(|+ +〉 − | − −〉), (14)
|B11〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) = 1√
2
(| −+〉 − |+−〉). (15)
If Pi and Pi+1 shared a known Bell state, and each one measures one component of the Bell state in the same basis (in
the computational basis or in the diagonal basis), they will obtain a certain relationship between their measurement
results. For a fake Bell state (the state of quantum memories (2i − 1) and (2i − 2) is not a Bell state, we call it a
fake Bell state) used for detection, P0 is able to pass the detection with probability of
1
2 . P0 may distribute only one
fake Bell state between Pi and Pi+1 and another fake Bell state between Pi−1 and Pi such that these two states are
in the same chain to obtain Pi’s private bit. At the same time, P0 can get the maximum probability of passing the
detection. In this case, these two states should not be chosen for detection. The probability of escaping the detection
is L2/(L + R)2. For i = 1 or i = n, this probability becomes L/(L + R). These two probabilities of P0 passing the
detection and obtaining one bit of one participant will approach 0 if R is large enough. As a result, P0 fails to steal
participants’ private input bits.
9V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we discuss some practical aspects of our protocol in the light of new developments in the field.
In general, secure multi-party quantum computation requires an infrastructure for reliable quantum communications
as provided by quantum repeaters and quantum networks. Our protocol is not an exception, but given that some
of the required resources for our protocol, as listed in Table I, are easier to achieve, we can envisage a small-scale
demonstration of this protocol in the near future. Multicore optical fibres [41, 42] can be used to fish this task.
One of the key requirements in our scheme is to distribute Bell states between two parties. A full implementation
of this aspect over any arbitrary distance is only possible with fully functional quantum repeaters. This may not be
possible in the near future. But, a small-scale quantum network with nodes within tens of km from each other is
within reach. In fact, there are activities in Netherlands, for instance, to implement a four node quantum network
within the country. Such a network can then be used for an initial demonstration of protocols like ours.
Another requirement of our system is that of quantum memories for storing and processing entangled states. In
principle, we can run our protocol once all required entangled states are shared among users. This may increase the
waiting time as well as the required storage/coherence time for memories. For a small-scale demonstration, with a
few number of players at short distances from each other, this, can, however, be manageable. Quantum memories
such as nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond [43] , or trapped ions [44, 45], offer long storage times that could be
suitable for our protocol. Plus, both these memories offer settings in which high-quality deterministic CNOT gates
can be performed. The latter is necessary in order to keep our protocol loss resilient.
In terms of performance, there are two parameters that typically matter: At what rate, we can distribute entangled
states among parties, and what would be the quality of the generated entangled state. The rate of entanglement
generation is mainly affected by channel loss, but, for moderately short links, this may not be the major obstacle. For
instance, if the maximum distance between two players is 50 km, for standard optical fiber channels with 0.2 dB/km
loss, we have a channel transmissivity of 0.1. By accounting for a similar efficiency, for other parts of the system,
we have a 1% chance in generating entangled states in every attempt. For a repetition rate of 1 M/s, we can then
generate 10,000 entangled links per second, which should be sufficient for a small-scale demonstration. In terms of
quality, in our analysis, we have assumed perfect Bell states can be exchanged among users. This is in principle
possible if one can use entanglement distillation or error correction techniques. For a simple demonstration, however,
it is more likely that we have to accept a bit of error in our system. This error rate would scale with the distance
between the shared entangled state versus maximally entangled states, as well as with the number of players. One
should also add to that the errors that might arise during the Bell-state measurements. In the end, if the error caused
by imperfections in the system is too high, the protocol will abort during its verification stage.
One final note is about the number of Bell states that are needed for attack detection in our protocol. Here, in
principle, we are using similar ideas as those used in quantum key distribution (QKD) for detecting eavesdroppers.
But, unlike QKD, the ratio L/R, in our case, should be very low to keep the protocol secure. The main reason behind
this is that, in any quantum summation protocol, the protocol fails even if only one of the private bits gets revealed.
That is, we have no chance to remove the information that has leaked to an eavesdropper once it has happened,
whereas, in QKD, one can use privacy amplification to reduced the amount of leaked information about the final key.
This seems to be a common issue in all quantum summation protocols and is not specific to our case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a secure multi-party quantum summation protocol based on quantum teleportation, in which a third
party (TP), who could be malicious but non-collusive, was involved. The correctness and the security of the protocol
were analyzed in detail. Our protocol did not require multi-partite entangled states. Only bipartite states (Bell states),
Pauli operators and Bell measurement were needed in our protocol. The latter were all required in any teleportation
protocol, which would be implicitly used in all other quantum summation protocols as well. By reducing the required
resources to those needed for teleportation, we, in effect, proposed the most feasible quantum summation protocol,
which could, in principle, be demonstrated, at small scales, using current quantum technologies. A more detailed
error analysis is needed to account for the effect of imperfect entanglement distribution and/or operation errors. We
will consider these imperfections in our future work.
10
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.11647140, 61602316,
61872152, 61502179), the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province of China (Grant Nos. 2018A030310147,
2016A030310027, 2014A030310265), Guangdong Program for Special Support of Top-notch Young Professionals (No.
2015TQ01X796), Pearl River Nova Program of Guangzhou (No. 201610010037), the Science and Technology In-
novation Projects of Shenzhen (No. JCYJ20170818140234295), and the CICAEET fund and the PAPD fund (No.
KJR1615). Mohsen Razavi acknowledges the support of UK EPSRC Grant EP/M013472/1. Cai Zhang is sponsored
by the State Scholarship Fund of the China Scholarship Council. All data generated in this paper can be reproduced
by the provided methodology.
Appendix A: Analysis of the Multi-party Quantum Summation
1. Correctness Analysis
We assume that all participants provide correct private bit strings. For the convenience of analyzing the correctness
of our protocol, we define the relationship between quantum states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and classical bits as follows:
E(|ϕ〉) =
{
0, if |ϕ〉 ∈ {|0〉, |+〉},
1, if |ϕ〉 ∈ {|1〉, |−〉}. (A1)
Furthermore, if
|ϕ′〉 = Um|ϕ〉, (A2)
where m ∈ {0, 1}, |ϕ〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, U = ZX and a global phase is ignored, then
E(|ϕ′〉) = E(|ϕ〉)⊕m. (A3)
In (Step 3) of the protocol, V i2i and V
i
2i+1 (i = 0, 1, . . . , n) form L ordered Bell states. V
0
0 and V
n
2n+1 are held by
P0 and V
i−1
2i−1 and V
i
2i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are in Pi’s hands. For the j-th (j = 1, 2, . . . , L) Bell state between V
i
2i and
V i2i+1(i = 0, 1, . . . , n), combining with the j-th state in quantum memory G
0
T , the initial state is
|ζ0j 〉 = |ϕj〉T ⊗ |ψ′0j 〉01 ⊗ |ψ′1j 〉23 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψ′nj 〉(2n)(2n+1). (A4)
Suppose that
|ψ′0j 〉01 = |Ba0b0〉j01, (A5)
|ψ′1j 〉23 = |Ba1b1〉j23, (A6)
. . . , (A7)
|ψ′nj 〉(2n)(2n+1) = |Banbn〉j(2n)(2n+1), (A8)
and Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) performs U
mij
i (Ui = U = ZX) on the j-th state of V
i−1
2i−1, the state becomes
|ζ1j 〉 = 12n+1
∑
x0j∈{0,1}
∑
y0j∈{0,1}
∑
x1j∈{0,1}
∑
y1j∈{0,1}
. . .
∑
xnj∈{0,1}
∑
ynj∈{0,1}
(−1)Σni=0xij ·bi |Bx0jy0j 〉jT0 ⊗ |Bx1jy1j 〉j12 ⊗ . . .⊗ |Bxnjynj 〉j(2n−1)(2n)
⊗ Z⊕Σni=0bi⊕yij X⊕Σni=0ai⊕xijU⊕Σni=1mij |ϕj〉2n+1, (A9)
according to Eqs. (3-8), and a global phase of the state of quantum memory (2n+ 1) is ignored.
After Pi (i = 0, 1, . . . , n) measures the corresponding states in the Bell basis, obtaining the measurement outcome
xijyij (j = 1, 2, . . . , L), the state of quantum memory (2n+ 1) collapses to
Z⊕Σ
n
i=0bi⊕yijX⊕Σ
n
i=0ai⊕xijU⊕Σ
n
i=1mij |ϕj〉2n+1. (A10)
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With the announcement of xijyij (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) provided by Pi, P0 knowing the initial Bell states can calculate
⊕∑ni=0 ai ⊕ xij , (A11)
⊕∑ni=0 bi ⊕ yij . (A12)
Later, X⊕Σ
n
i=0ai⊕xijZ⊕Σ
n
i=0bi⊕yij is performed on quantum memory (2n + 1). Consequently, the state of quantum
memory (2n+ 1) turns into
|ϕ′j〉2n+1 = U⊕Σ
n
i=1mij |ϕj〉2n+1. (A13)
After the measurement of quantum memory (2n+ 1) in the same basis as that of quantum memory T , P0 gains
E(|ϕj〉T )⊕ (⊕Σni=1mij) = E(|ϕ′j〉2n+1), (A14)
and therefore obtains the result
⊕ Σni=1mij = E(|ϕj〉T )⊕ E(|ϕ′j〉2n+1), (A15)
for the j-th bit of the sum modulo 2 of participants’ private bit strings, by using Eqs. (A1-A3). In the end, P0 is able
to learn about the sum modulo 2 of participants’ private bit strings.
2. Security Analysis
There exist two types of participant attacks, one from TP(P0) and the other from some dishonest participants. We
showed earlier how our protocol is secure against attacks by TP. Here we demonstrate how our protocol can be kept
secure in the presence of malicious participants. Note that n − 1 dishonest participants can easily steal the honest
participant’s private bit string if the summation is revealed in public. But if the summation is kept secret in TP’s
hands, n − 1 dishonest participant cannot obtain anything about the honest participant’s private input. Here, we
show that our protocol is secure against the collusive attack of n − 2 dishonest participants, which is the maximum
possible in this case.
Attacks from (n − 2) dishonest participants (not including P0). If (n − 2) dishonest participants wish to steal the
other two honest participants’ private bit strings Mp and Mq (p < q), they may employ the states in their hands to
get useful information. We consider the j-th bit (j = 1, 2, . . . , L) in Mp and Mq and the corresponding states.
For q 6= p + 1, we first show how dishonest participants try to learn about mpj , as shown in Figure 4. In this
case, Pp+1 does not apply unitary operation on quantum memory (2p+ 1) and Bell-state measurement on quantum
memories (2p+ 1) and (2p+ 2). After the private input encoding stage (Step 3), the state of quantum memory T and
quantum memories 0 ∼ (2p+ 1) will be
|ζ1j 〉 = 12p
∑
x0∈{0,1}
∑
y0∈{0,1}
∑
x1∈{0,1}
∑
y1∈{0,1}
. . .
∑
xp∈{0,1}
∑
yp∈{0,1}
(−1)Σpk=0xk·bk |Bx0y0〉jT0 ⊗ |Bx1y1〉j12 ⊗ . . .⊗ |Bxpyp〉j(2p−1)(2p)
⊗ Z⊕Σpk=0bk⊕ykX⊕Σpk=0ak⊕xkU⊕Σpk=1mkj |ϕj〉2p+1, (A16)
where the j-th state in quantum memory T is |ϕj〉T and the j-th Bell state shared between Ps and Ps+1 (s = 0, 1, . . . , p)
is |Basbs〉j(2s)(2s+1). The dishonest participants try to get mpj from quantum memory (2p + 1). However, they will
fail.
From Eq. (A16), we can see that if Pp+1 knows msj (s = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1) , the basis of |ϕj〉T and (ar, br) (r =
0, 1, . . . , p) (the information about the initial Bell states), she can first apply the right correction on quantum memory
(2p+ 1) and measure it in the right basis. According to msj (s = 1, 2, . . . , p− 1), she can then obtain mpj . But she
cannot do that. Even though Pp+1 knows msj (s = 0, 1, . . . , p − 1) with the assistance of Ps and the measurement
results (x0y0, x1y1, . . . , xpyp), she knows nothing about the basis of |ϕj〉T and (ar, br) that are kept secret by P0.
Thus, she cannot perform the right correction on quantum memory (2p+1) and measure it in the right basis. Finally,
she fails to obtain mpj , let alone Mp. Similarly, they cannot learn about Mq.
For q = p+ 1, they may use a similar method as in the above case to take Mp and Mq. Namely, Pp+2 does nothing
on quantum memory (2p+3) and skips Bell-state measurement on the corresponding state. In this case. the dishonest
participants cannot even get the mpj ⊕m(p+1)j . Therefore, the privacy of Mp and Mq is preserved.
For any two Bell states |Bxy〉12 and |Bab〉34, if quantum memories 2 and 3 are measured in the Bell basis and the
measurement outcome |Bkm〉23 is obtained, the state of quantum memories 1 and 4 then collapses to |Bxy⊕ab⊕km〉14
due to the Bell entanglement swapping property.
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FIG. 4. Attack by (n− 2) participants, where Pp and Pq are honest participants.
FIG. 5. Entanglement swapping attack by (n− 2) participants, where Pp and Pq are honest participants.
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The dishonest participants may also start an attack based on the entanglement swapping property. For the case of
q 6= p+1, as shown in the dash box in Figure 5, the j-th Bell state shared between Pp−1 and Pp and that shared between
Pp and Pp+1 are |Bap−1bp−1〉j(2p−2)(2p−1) and |Bapbp〉j(2p)(2p+1), respectively. After Pp performs U
mpj
p (Up = ZX) on
quantum memory (2p − 1) and then measures quantum memories (2p − 1) and (2p) in the Bell basis, obtaining the
measurement outcome |Bxpyp〉j(2p−1)(2p), the state of quantum memories (2p− 2) and (2p+ 1) becomes
(I ⊗ Umpjp )|B(ap−1bp−1)⊕(apbp)⊕(xpyp)〉j(2p−2)(2p+1), (A17)
due to the property of entanglement swapping. Pp+1 skips the private input encoding stage, instead she can collaborate
with Pp−1 to measure quantum memories (2p− 2) and (2p+ 1) in the Bell basis. Can the dishonest participants find
out U
mpj
p performed by Pp to steal mpj? The answer is no. Although Pp−1 and Pp+1 can measure quantum memories
(2p−2) and (2p+ 1) in the Bell basis and get xpyp after Pp’s announcement, they have to know ap−1bp−1 and apbp to
derive U
mpj
p , but this information is unknown to them. For the case of q = p + 1, the analysis is similar. Therefore,
this attack is also invalid to our protocol.
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